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1 Introduction 
This paper examines the possibility of reducing moral hazard and adverse selection in 
automobile insurance markets when the behavior of the insureds, which is related to the 
risk of accident, can ex post be observed or when the risk type can be revealed to the 
insurer before he pays the coverage. This research is motivated by the fast progress in 
automobile electronics engineering in recent years, which is, among other things, re-
flected in increasing performance and decreasing costs of the constituting electronic 
parts.1 Above all, this trend is manifested through improved sensors which are already 
                                                 
1  See e.g. Mattern (2003, 5-10). 
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able to detect mileage, speed and acceleration, braking,2 the distance to other traffic 
participants or the exact location and route of a vehicle3. A recent example is the device 
“TripSensor” with a corresponding service related to it, introduced in August 2004 by 
the US automobile insurer Progressive.4 Experts in electronics anticipate the design of 
ever more sophisticated tracking applications in the near future which will be able to 
detect, collect, and process information about the adherence to traffic signs and traffic 
regulation, the technical condition of the car5, and even precisely record the maneuvers 
of the vehicle in the limits of several cm.6 Furthermore personal identification and the 
observation of a considerable part of the behavior of the driver will be conceivable (e.g. 
the degree of attention7, the usage of driving belts, phone calls, spirits consumption 
etc.8). The reason for this information to be of interest to insurers is found in the strong 
relationship between the observed characteristics and the behavioral patterns of the 
drivers with their individual risks of accident. Thus, according to statistical data, the 
most common reasons for accidents are excessive speed, violation of the right of way or 
of the minimum distance, wrong turning, spirits consumption, and wrong overtaking.9 
Empirical evidence shows also a strong positive correlation between the number of 
miles driven or late night driving (especially on weekends) and the risk of having an 
accident.10 In principle, all of these data could individually be observed with the de-
scribed electronic devices. The potential use of this possibility can be discovered when 
looking at the present situation. 
Currently, apart from offering different self-selecting deductibles or coverage levels, 
insurers try to approach the actual risk of the insureds by categorizing them into risk 
groups according to personal and automobile-related data. These include age, sex, pro-
                                                 
2  See e.g. Spiegel Online. 
3  See e.g. “GPS Warehouse”. 
4  See Progressive Inusrance Corp. 
5  Oberholzer (2003, 434); Hitachi. 
6  Herrtwich (2003, 71-72), Coroama / Höckl (2004, 2). Despite the restrictions of the state-of-the-art, 
the technology currently used by Progressive Insurance Corp. has the same intended purpose. 
7  Currently the system performing this task consists of a computer and a camera, which tracks the 
frequency of blinking. As soon as the blinking slows down, an alarm signal is activated. Since falling 
asleep is a common reason for accidents, this application could, apart from tracking the behavior, 
contribute to safer driving (see “Autokiste”). 
8  Oberholzer (2003, 434). 
9  See the statistical data of ADAC. 
10  Progressive Insurance Corp. 
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fession, date of issue of the driving license, make of car, declared mileage. The very 
nature of these data implies a rather imprecise calculation of individual risk which can 
lead to very heterogeneous risk classes and from the viewpoint of the insured – to a very 
unfair categorization.11 Another way of dealing with asymmetric information is the 
yearly adjustment of the insurance premiums according to past accidents which serves 
to set incentives for safer driving on the one hand and on the other hand it corresponds 
to the continuous revelation of risk type to the insurer with time. The disadvantages of 
premium adjustment lie in the long period of time needed in order to find out the risk 
type of a given driver and the fact that good risks are “penalized” with a higher pre-
mium in the same way as bad risks when they report an accident.  
If the predictions about the future technological development are correct, and given that 
even today black boxes are increasingly often built into vehicles by automobile produc-
ers,12 one can pose the question if and how insurers will make use of black boxes for 
designing insurance contracts and what consequences this will have for the insureds and 
for social welfare. From the literature on information theory the second-best contracts 
which are established under asymmetric information are known to be self-selecting un-
der adverse selection and an incentive compatible contract under moral hazard. We ex-
amine a setting in which the insurer has the technical opportunity of offering in addition 
to the second-best contracts an optional contract with ex post revelation of perfect in-
formation which only takes place when an accident has occurred. With the insureds 
having the right to choose among all these alternative contracts the question arises, 
which contracts will finally persist in equilibrium in the market and what implications 
this will have for insureds, insurers and total welfare. We analyze these problems for 
moral hazard and adverse selection separately as well as both for perfect competitive 
and monopolistic markets. Another important issue which we address is how privacy 
concerns, when taken into account, will affect our results. 
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the general setting of the 
insurance model. Section 3 deals with the problem of adverse selection under perfect 
competition. First, we look at the referential situation when risk type is public informa-
tion (3.1). Then the situation with risk type being private information and the resulting 
loss of social welfare is discussed (3.2). Finally, the situation in which insurers are able 
to offer contracts that include a clause for contingent accession to the black box is ana-
lyzed (3.3). Since, in this context, the problem of privacy loss becomes of considerable 
                                                 
11  For a detailed discussion on imperfect categorization see Hoy (1992, 322). 
12  E.g. Newstarget network;  Spiegel – Online. 
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concern, we discuss possible reasons for and the consequences of having an aversion 
against the revelation of privacy (3.4). Adverse selection under monopoly is discussed 
in section 4 basically following the same pattern of thought as the previous section. 
Then the problem of moral hazard is briefly presented in the same framework, assuming 
monopoly first in section 5, and then assuming perfect competition in section 6. Section 
7 concludes. 
2 General setting of the model 
The purpose of the model is to present the negative social effect of asymmetric informa-
tion as is commonly known from the information literature and then, under the assump-
tion that a black box reveals perfect information, to show that the first-best situation as 
with symmetric information can be restored if the insurer is able to include a clause in 
the contract, which allows him to access the black box after an accident has occurred 
and use the information to infer on the risk of the particular insured. In terms of adverse 
selection this would mean that the review of the data would reveal some characteristics 
related to the risk type of the insured like concentration, the quickness of reactions, or 
the driving competence as a whole. Concerning the problem of moral hazard the black 
box could disclose some evidence on the exerted effort contributing to a reduced risk of 
accident. Specifically it is assumed that a black box reveals perfect information about 
the risk type of the driver and about his behavior respectively, and that no costs are in-
curred thereby. The insurers are risk-neutral and all drivers are risk-averse with the 
same utility function, constant absolute risk aversion and an initial wealth of W . The 
possible damage is denoted by L , with W L> . A particular insurance contract is de-
scribed by the insurance premium r  and the coverage d . It is also assumed that if the 
insureds are indifferent between two contracts they take that one which is preferred by 
the insurer.  
The possibility of offering different levels of coverage is justified when looking at the 
automobile insurance markets: even though the leeway of insurers is restricted through 
a regulation which prescribes a minimum coverage in third party liability insurance, 
firms do offer an alternative higher one, and in comprehensive insurance there are often 
several deductibles from which the insured can choose. Concerning the freedom of set-
ting the insurance premiums there are no legal restrictions since the deregulation in 
1994. Insurance premium adjustments, which would require a multi-period dynamic 
analysis, are completely ignored, but for the purpose of the model this should not be 
crucial. Another feature which is neglected in the model is the legal obligation to enter 
into a contract. If accounted for in the model, this regulation would mainly afflict the 
insured, since a given insurer may still get rid of a particular bad risk very quickly 
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whereas a customer would get with each insurer nearly the same conditions.13 The al-
ternative to insurance then would not be to drive without insurance, but to forego the 
possession of an own vehicle which would change the reservation utility. Still, for the 
conclusions of the model this is immaterial. 
3 Adverse selection under perfect competition 
When concentrating on the two contract variables mentioned above ( , )d r  (and thus 
ignoring the fact that insurers differentiate through various additional services) and con-
sidering the great number of firms in the market for automobile insurance, the assump-
tion of perfect competition seems an appropriate one. Further it is assumed that there 
are two risk types of drivers - low risk (L) and high risk (H) with probability of accident 
(0,1)Lp ∈  and (0,1)Hp ∈ , with H Lp p> . All drivers know their own risk type with 
certainty. The proportion of the low risks in the population is q  and all drivers have the 
utility function ( )u w .  
3.1 Symmetric information 
In the referential situation with risk type being public information the optimal contracts 
are obtained with the insureds, each risk type separately, maximizing their expected 
utility under the zero-profit constraint of the insurers. The maximization problem for 
each risk type is therefore: 
(1) 
,
max ( ) (1 ) ( )
iK iK
i iK iK i iK
r d
p u W L r d p u W r⋅ − − + + − ⋅ −     
  
s.t. 0iK i iKr p d− ⋅ ≥ ,  ,i L H=  
The resulting contracts are ( , ) ( , )iK iK iK iC d r L p L= ⋅ . The indemnity covers the whole 
loss, so that the risk-neutral insurers take on the whole risk and for this the insureds pay 
the actuarially fair premium corresponding to their individual risk. These contracts are 
Pareto-optimal. In the state-preference diagram (see Fig. 1) the axes represent the net 
wealth in case of an accident (A) and in case of no accident (NA). PO  represents the 
contingent wealth position without insurance. The optimal contracts are found as the 
tangency points between the indifference curves of the insureds and the respective zero-
                                                 
13  This is true under perfect competition. In fact, different insurance companies do offer slightly differ-
ing premiums for one and the same risk class, which is explained by their service differentiation 
through characteristics other than coverage. Therefore and because of the large number of insurers 
the automobile insurance market could be characterized as monopolistic competition.  
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profit lines of the insurers with slopes corresponding to the accident probabilities  
(1 ) /i ip p− − . As can be seen, these tangency points lie on the certainty line of the in-
sureds meaning complete insurance. 
A
NA
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0H =π
HKC
LKC
45° 45°
OA
BBHC −
)C(U HKH
1
0L =π
LAC
)drLW( +−−
)rW( −LKBB rWrW −=−
 
Figure 1: Adverse selection, perfect competition, RS 
3.2 Asymmetric information 
In case that the risk type is private information the contract set just found cannot persist, 
since the high risks will choose the contract designed for the low risks, thus leading to 
negative profits. 
The equilibrium contracts under perfect competition and asymmetric information may 
differ depending on which equilibrium concept is chosen. For the Rothschild / Stiglitz 
(1976) equilibrium (denoted as RS) it is assumed that firms follow pure Nash-strategies 
with each firm considering the behavior of its rivals as fixed and making its own deci-
sions without anticipating any reactions of the other firms. As a consequence of this 
assumption, a contract set can constitute an equilibrium, only if every single contract 
earns zero profits. With that no cross-subsidization from low risks to high risks is possi-
ble.14 Another consequence is that a pooling equilibrium cannot exist.15  It can be shown 
that for every given pooling contract PC  there is another contract TC , which will be 
                                                 
14  See Rothschild / Stigtlitz (1976, 643 f.) for an explanation. 
15  Rothschild / Stiglitz (1976, 634 f.). 
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preferred by the low risks, rejected by the high risks and earn strictly positive profits for 
the insurer if offered, which means that PC  cannot be an equilibrium.16 Hence, if there 
is an equilibrium, it must be a separating one.  
In order to determine the optimal contracts under asymmetric information the firm has 
to ensure that the high risks will not choose the contract for the low risks. The reverse 
will not happen, since low risks are strictly worse off when choosing the first-best con-
tract for high risks HKC . So HKC  will remain in the equilibrium set.17 The contract for 
the low risks is determined by adding a self-selection constraint for the high risk type H 
(2)  ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )HK H L L H Lu W r p u W L r d p u W r− ≥ ⋅ − − + + − ⋅ −  
to the maximization problem (1) for i L= . Both constraints are binding so that graphi-
cally the optimal contract LAC  is found as the intersection between the low-risk zero-
profit line and the high-risk indifference curve passing through HKC  (see Fig. 1). High 
risks are no worse off under asymmetric information while low risks buy only partial 
insurance and therefore suffer a loss of utility. Hence, the information asymmetry 
causes a loss of welfare. 
A separating equilibrium may not exist under the assumptions made. Intuitively this 
may be the case when an imaginary alternative pooling contract seems relatively attrac-
tive. According to Rothschild / Stiglitz (1976, 637) this applies when high risks are too 
few, or if the probabilities of accident are only weakly apart, or if the risk aversion of 
the insureds is too high. A smaller proportion of high risks corresponds to lower costs of 
pooling to the low risks - with an imaginary pooling contract they would have to subsi-
dize only a few high risks. The same is true for just weakly differing probabilities of 
accident which would imply relatively low subsidies per high risk. Finally, higher risk 
aversion implies higher costs for the low risk type of partially taking over the risk and 
hence higher costs of self-selection. 
Since an equilibrium may not always exist on the one hand and on the other hand, since 
the assumptions made do not allow for cross-subsidization from low risks to high risks, 
                                                 
16  Rothschild / Stiglitz (1976, 633) define equilibrium as a set of contracts such that, when the insureds 
choose among them to maximize expected utility „(i) no contract in the equilibrium set makes nega-
tive expected profits; and (ii) there is no contract outside the equilibrium set that, if offered, will 
make nonnegative profits“.  
17  It can be shown that a self-selection constraint for type L is not binding so that the maximization 
problem for the high risk corresponds to the public information case (1). (see i.e. Dionne / Doherty / 
Fombaron (2000, 206-208)). 
 - 8 -
which is sometimes suggested by empirical evidence18, the RS Nash equilibrium con-
cept may be insufficient for explaining the automobile insurance market. Therefore one 
can resort to the Wilson-Miyazaki-Spence (WMS) equilibrium concept, for instance, 
which assumes anticipatory behavior of the firms, such that firms consider the other 
firm’s reactions.19 In this case a set of contracts is said to be an equilibrium if there is no 
other contract set “outside the equilibrium set such that, if offered, would earn a non-
negative profit even after the unprofitable [contracts] in the original set have been with-
drawn”20. For a sufficiently high proportion of high risks (1 )WMSq−  it corresponds to 
the RS equilibrium and otherwise it implies separating contracts with cross-
subsidization. The equilibrium contract set ( , )HS LSC C  in the latter case is depicted in 
Fig. 2. In this figure, even though a RS equilibrium exists (the pooled zero-profit line 
0Pπ =  does not cut the low-risk indifference curve through LAC ), the social welfare is 
improved through moving from the RS equilibrium to the cross-subsidizing contracts: 
the insurers still have zero total profits, but both high and low risks get on higher indif-
ference curves. Hence, in this case the RS equilibrium is not “second-best efficient”. 
According to Dionne / Doherty / Fombaron (2000, 212) a RS equilibrium is second-best 
efficient21, if and only if the proportion of high risks (1 )q−  is higher than some critical 
value (1 )WMSq− which is itself higher than the critical value (1 )RSq−  needed for the 
existence of an RS separating equilibrium.22 
Rothschild / Stiglitz (1976, 644) derive the critical value (1 )WMSq− from the optimal 
subsidy problem:  
(3) 
,
max ( ) (1 ) ( )
LA
L LA LA L LA
d s
p u W r L d t p u W r t⋅ − − + − + − ⋅ − −  
s.t.  ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )HK H LA LA H LAu W r s p u W r L d t p u W r t− + ≥ ⋅ − − + − + − ⋅ − −  
  0s ≥ ,    
                                                 
18  For his empirical research of the French automobile insurance market Dionne (2001, 20), for in-
stance, considers cross-subsidization from low to high risks as a characteristic of this market. In con-
trast, Puelz / Snow (1994) find that there is no such cross-subsidization. 
19  See Dionne / Doherty / Fombaron (2000, 209-212). Specifically the firms are assumed to have „Wil-
son foresight“ which means that „no firm will offer one or more contracts that, although initially 
earning nonnegative profits, will cause other firms to withdraw their policies, with the result that the 
initial firm earns negative profits“ (Hoy (1982, 322)).   
20  Crocker / Snow (1985, 213). 
21  "An allocation is second-best efficient if it is Pareto-optimal within the set of allocations that are 
feasible and the zero-profit constraint on the portfolio” (Dionne / Doherty / Fombaron (2000, 211)).  
22  See also Crocker / Snow (1985, 213). 
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with LA L LAr p d= ⋅ . (1 ) /t q s q= − ⋅  is the “tax” that each low risk has to pay and s  is 
the subsidy that each high risk receives. If the constraint 0s ≥  is binding, then the sec-
ond-best efficient contract set is the RS equilibrium without subsidy and in this case it 
holds: 
'( ) '( ) '( )(1 ) (1 )
'( ) '( )
H LA LA LAWMS L L
WMS LA LA LA H L
u W p L u W L r d u W rq p p
q u W r u W L r d p p
⎡ ⎤− ⋅ ⋅ − − + − −− ⋅ −⎣ ⎦> ⋅− ⋅ − − + − . 
Formally the optimal contracts in Fig. 2 can also be found by maximizing the expected 
utility of the low-risks under the incentive compatibility constraint of the high risks and 
the zero-total- profit constraint23:  
(4) 
, , ,
max ( ) (1 ) ( )
LS LS HS HS
L LS LS L LS
r d r d
p u W r L d p u W r⋅ − − + + − ⋅ −  
s.t. 
( ) (1 ) ( )
( ) (1 ) ( )
H HS HS H HS
H LS LS H LS
p u W r L d p u W r
p u W r L d p u W r
⋅ − − + + − ⋅ −
≥ ⋅ − − + + − ⋅ −  
( ) (1 ) ( ) 0LS L LS HS H HSq r p d q r p d⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅ − ⋅ ≥  
The outcome is full insurance for high risks with a better than fair premium. Compared 
to the RS equilibrium low risks have to pay more than their fair premium but they re-
ceive a greater coverage now, which eventually makes them better off.  
A
NA
LKC
0H =π
OP
2
)C(U HKH
0L =π
LSC
HKC
HSC
LAC
)C(U LAL
0P =π
BBLC −
 
Figure 2: Adverse selection, perfect competition, WMS 
                                                 
23  See Crocker / Snow (1985, 209-211).  
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3.3 Contract with a clause for black box accession  
Now it is assumed that the insurer has the possibility of offering a contract that permits 
him accession to the data collected by the black box, provided that an accident has oc-
curred, and that he hereby obtains perfect information about the risk type of the particu-
lar driver. If an accident does not occur, the insurer cannot know what risk type has 
taken the contract, hence he can differentiate only through the indemnity he pays after 
the accident, but not through the insurance premium. Starting with the RS equilibrium, 
it is obvious that the good risks, who are made worse off by the information asymmetry, 
would be willing to reveal their risk type if they were given a chance to do so. There-
fore, the insurer can now offer a contract including the clause for contingent accession 
to the black box BBC , which is intended for low risks and corresponds to their first-best 
contract LKC , i.e. it offers full coverage, but this is only paid after the insurer verifies 
that the driver is really a low risk. Concerning the bad risks, the insurer has to prevent 
their preferring this contract BBC  to their first-best contract HKC . This is achieved by 
determining the coverage H BBd − , in case that the driver turns out to be a high risk in 
such a way, that it satisfies the new self-selecting constraint of the high risk type: 
(5) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )H H L H BB H Lu W p L p u W L p L d p u W p L−− ⋅ = ⋅ − − ⋅ + + − ⋅ − ⋅   
Graphically, the contract ( , , )BB LK H BB LKC d d r−  can be seen in Fig. 1. In fact, it consists 
of two separate wealth positions which are contingent on risk type: ( , )LK LK LKC d r  if 
low risk, and ( , )H BB H BB LKC d r− −  if high risk. Yet, in both contingent wealth positions 
the insurance premium and hence the net wealth in the case of no accident (NA) is iden-
tical. Now, with the possibility of ex post observation the first-best situa-
tion ( , )HK LKC C is actually achieved. At the same time this is a Pareto-improvement in 
comparison to the previous contract set ( , )HK LAC C . It also follows that under the as-
sumptions made, verification in that state only, in which the claim against the insurer 
arises, is sufficient, thus making continuous observation of driving behavior unneces-
sary.  
The situation is a little bit different when considering a WMS equilibrium with cross 
subsidization. As can be seen in Fig. 2 bad risks are better off with the information 
asymmetry than with their first-best contract. So, they would resist to the introduction 
of the contract with a check-up, if they had some influence on that. However, the as-
sumption, that firms possess Wilson’s foresight, which is actually the prerequisite for a 
WMS equilibrium, and the assumption that the black box reveals perfect information, 
imply that equilibrium contracts will evolve to the first-best contracts HKC and BBC  
(which is in effect LKC ). This makes low risks better off (they get LKC instead of LSC ) 
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and high risks worse off (they get HKC instead of HSC ), so that no Pareto-improvement 
takes place. One can ascertain that, under the assumptions made, only the contract set 
( HKC , LKC ) fulfills the requirements for a WMS equilibrium24.  
Still, it would be possible to have a Pareto-improvement in comparison to the contract 
set HSC and LSC , if firms continued offering the contract HSC  (instead of switching to 
HKC ) for high risks while offering a contract with a clause for contingent accession to 
the black box 
( , ), if type L
( , ), if type H
L BB S L BB S
BB S
H BB S H BB S L BB S
C L r
C
C d r
− − − −
−
− − − − − −
⎧= ⎨⎩
   
in addition to it (in Fig. 2 only L BB SC − −  is depicted), with which total profits are just 
equal to zero. Again the indemnity H BB Sd − −  in case that a high risk takes the contract 
with the stipulated accession to the black box must be determined such that high risks 
continue choosing HSC . In this way high risks are no worse off than with asymmetric 
information. The insurers still make zero total profits.25 Low risks indeed continue sub-
sidizing high risks, yet they are better off because of receiving complete insurance now.  
One can ascertain, that this contract set will not be an equilibrium under the assump-
tions made, since there exists another contract set (e.g. ,HK BBC C ) which, when offered, 
will make the original contract set ( ,HS BB SC C − ) unprofitable and earn non-negative 
(zero) profits even after the unprofitable contract set is withdrawn. Hence, the contract 
set ( ,HS BB SC C − ) could only persist with regulation. 
What has just been shown to be Pareto-improving contracts is already applied in prac-
tice. Progressive Insurance Corp. offers alternatively to its former contracts a new con-
tract including the so-called “TripSensor”. With this device insureds can collect data 
about their driving behavior and submit it periodically to the insurer. Progressive prom-
ises, that regardless of how unfavorable the submitted data are, only premium decreases 
(in the range of 5-25%) are possible after signing the TripSense contract. Insofar, pro-
vided that this promise is really held, these contract conditions are not a good example 
in support of the WMS equilibrium, implying that there is either no cross-subsidization 
                                                 
24  See Hoy (1982, pp. 331-336) for an analysis of WMS equilibria when imperfect information on risk 
type is available to insurers. 
25  As can be seen in Fig. 2 the contract designed for low risks L BBC −  lies on the same (dashed) iso-profit 
line as the initial contract LSC . This means, that the subsidy per high risk has not changed, so that the 
total profit of the insurers is still equal to zero. 
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between contracts or no Wilson foresight between firms. It is also interesting to notice, 
that Progressive offers additional discounts merely for signing up this contract and then 
each time for just submitting the data.26 One possible reason might be the attempt to 
compensate the insureds for their loss of privacy. 
3.4 Privacy 
The very thought of using black boxes inevitably raises the question of privacy. There 
might be two prominent reasons for insureds to dislike being observed: the first reason 
might be the intrinsic disutility from revealing personal data and the second reason the 
utility loss related to premium risk. The considerations below pertain to the RS equilib-
rium. 
Concerning the first reason, one can imagine that the disutility from the revelation of 
personal data is an additional component ( )g BB  to the already existing utility function 
( )u w  which is subtracted from it in case that the black box is reviewed. It is assumed 
that some proportion k  of the low risks (denoted below as k -type low risks) suffers 
such a disutility when personal data are revealed. Thus, a utility function of 
( , ) ( ) ( )U w BB u w g BB= −  is generated in this state of nature. Further it is assumed that 
the rest of low risks (denoted below as (1 )k− -type low risks) don not mind being ob-
served: their utility function remains ( )u w  whether or not a black box is used, i.e., it is 
completely independent of the application of a black box per se. One can easily ascer-
tain that (i) the contract set HKC and BBC  resulting in 3.3 (see Fig. 1) will persist, if the 
k -type low risks still prefer BBC  to LAC , i.e., if ( ) ( ) ( )L LK L L LAEU C p g BB EU C− ⋅ > ; 
(ii) all three contracts HKC , LAC  and BBC will persist in equilibrium, if the disutility 
from the revelation of data is so high, that k -type low risks prefer the second-best con-
tract, that is if ( ) ( ) ( )L LK L L LAEU C p g BB EU C− ⋅ < . Indeed, if k -type low risks choose 
the contract including the clause for contingent accession to the black box, they will 
suffer an expected disutility from the revelation of personal data per se amounting to 
( )Lp g BB− ⋅ , since only in case that an accident occurs (with a probability of Lp ) the 
review of the black box  and the disutility following from this ( )g BB−  will take place. 
At the same time, however, this contract with contingent accession to the black box in 
effect results in the first-best contract LKC  offering full insurance and therefore, as was 
formerly shown, a higher expected utility. Therefore, k -type low risks have to trade off 
these two effects. In the former case the additional expected utility from having com-
plete insurance is sufficiently high in order to compensate the expected disutility from 
                                                 
26  Progressive Insurance Corp.  
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revealing personal data. Thus, besides the (1 )k− -type low risks, for whom nothing has 
changed compared to 3.3, k -type low risks will also choose the contract BBC . As be-
fore, high risks take their first-best contract HKC . In contrast, in the latter case the ex-
pected disutility ( )Lp g BB− ⋅  is so high, that it outweighs the benefits from receiving 
complete insurance. Hence it restrains the k -type low risks from choosing the contract 
with contingent accession to the black box. They prefer the second-best contract LAC . 
Of course, (1 )k− -type low risks continue preferring BBC  and high risks HKC , so that 
in this case the equilibrium set consists of all three contracts. 
It follows that, unless there are only k -type low risks in the population ( 1k = ) who, in 
addition, suffer such a great disutility from the revelation of personal data, that they 
prefer the second-best contract (i.e. ( ) ( ) ( )L LK L L LAEU C p g BB EU C− ⋅ < ), there will 
always be a Pareto-improvement of social welfare, when a contract with contingent ac-
cession to the black box BBC  is offered. In other words, if there is just one low risk who 
eventually prefers this contract, the total effect on social welfare will be positive. 
Premium (or classification) risk arises when the insured does not know his own risk 
type with certainty and, by agreeing to a check-up, incurs the additional risk (i.e. apart 
from the risk of accident) of turning out to be one of either types, i.e. the risk of being 
charged a higher premium if the outcome is “high risk type”. There is plenty of litera-
ture on risk categorization, which is often related to genetic testing in health insurance. 
For instance it is shown that the social and private (i.e. to the insureds) value of costless 
additional information on risk type is negative if it is public27 or if it is private with in-
surers, however, being able to observe the information status of the agents28. Here it is 
not the objective to provide an overview of the theory on risk classification.29 Just an 
exemplary possible case will be presented in order to demonstrate, that in the presence 
of uncertainty about risk type, the readiness of the customers to choose the contract with 
a clause for contingent accession to the black box might be reduced. 
                                                 
27  Doherty / Posey (1998, pp. 194-196). 
28  Doherty / Thistle (1996, 85, 88). 
29  The articles on this topic analyze various scenarios depending on whether the additional information 
that can be obtained is public or private, whether the insurers can observe the information status of 
the agents, whether the agents can decide if to reveal the contents of the additional information, 
whether they have a priori knowledge concerning their risk type etc. (see e.g. Crocker / Snow (2000), 
Crocker / Snow (1992), Crocker / Snow (1986), Hoy (1982), Doherty / Thistle (1996), Doherty / Po-
sey (1998)).  
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It is assumed that there are informed low risks (L), informed high risks (H) and unin-
formed people (U). It is common knowledge that the uninformed might be good risk 
with a probability of q . From the viewpoint of the insurers there are three types of driv-
ers, so that the equilibrium contracts, provided that equilibrium exists, are HKC , 'UC  
und 'LAC  (see Fig. 3) with the self-selecting constraints holding for type H:  
(6) ( ) ( ' ') (1 ) ( ')H H U U U H U Uu W p L p u W L p d d p u W p d− ⋅ = ⋅ − − ⋅ + + − ⋅ − ⋅   
and for type U:   
(7) ( ' ') (1 ) ( ')U U U U U U Up u W L p d d p u W p d⋅ − − ⋅ + + − ⋅ − ⋅ =  
( ' ') (1 ) ( ')U L LA LA U L LAp u W L p d d p u W p d⋅ − − ⋅ + + − ⋅ − ⋅ , 
where (1 )U L Hp q p q p= ⋅ + − ⋅  
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Figure 3: Adverse selection, privacy concerns 
As is shown in the figure, good risks are worse off in the presence of uninformed people 
[ ( ') ( )L LA L LAEU C EU C< ] since now they have to differentiate from both H and U risk 
types by partially assuming the risk of accident. Now, the insurer who considers offer-
ing contracts with contingent accession to the black box has two alternative choices: the 
first one is to offer such a contract that is originally intended only for low risks. The 
contract from 3.3 BBC  (with wealth position H BBC − , if high risk ) will not discourage 
the uninformed from choosing it since in comparison to the high risk drivers they still 
have a chance of turning out to be low risks, hence there is a greater probability of the 
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better outcome ( )LW r− . Since their taking the contract from 3.3 would imply a loss to 
the insurer, a stronger self-selecting constraint for the uninformed must be set. Hence, 
the corresponding coverage must satisfy: 
(8) ( ' ') (1 ) ( ')U U U U U U Up u W L p d d p u W p d⋅ − − ⋅ + + − ⋅ − ⋅ =  
 (1 ) ( ) [(1 ) (1 ) ] ( )H L HU BB H Lq p u W L p L d q p q u W p L−− ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ + + − ⋅ − + ⋅ − ⋅  
So the indemnity necessary to just prevent both uninformed (U) and informed high risks 
(H) from choosing the contract with black box will be HU BBd − .30 Thus, uninformed driv-
ers will remain so and only the low risks will agree to a contract with contingent acces-
sion to the black box.  
The second alternative to the insurer, provided that competitive pressure will cause the 
contract offered 'BBC  to end up in the contingent wealth position LKC  (with the insur-
ance premium Lp L⋅ ) for informed low risks, would simply be to set the indemnity for 
the case that the driver turns out to be a high risk in a way that ensures zero-profits, no 
matter if informed high risks or uninformed take the contract. In Fig. 3 this implies the 
wealth position ' [( / ) , ]H BB L H LC p p L p L− ⋅ ⋅  contingent on the driver’s turning out to be 
a high risk. All low risks (L) will choose the contract with contingent accession to the 
black box; all high risks (H) will deny it. The question is, what the uninformed (U) driv-
ers will do. Following the model of Doherty / Thistle (1996, 92 f.), it is assumed first, 
that all insurers expect the uninformed to become informed (i.e., to choose the contract 
with contingent accession to the black box). In this case they will offer the contract set 
HKC  and 
( , ), if type L
'
'( , ), if type H
LK L
BB L
BB L
H
C L p L
C pC L p L
p
⎧ ⋅⎪= ⎨ ⋅ ⋅⎪⎩
. 
Should the uninformed really get informed, then they will have an expected utility of 
(9)
( ') ( ) (1 ) ( ') ( )
(1 ) ( ( / ) ) (1 ) ( )
U BB L LK H H BB L
H L L H H L
EU C q EU C q EU C q u W p L
q p u W p L L p p L p u W p L
−= ⋅ + − ⋅ = ⋅ − ⋅ +
⎡ ⎤− ⋅ − ⋅ − + ⋅ + − ⋅ − ⋅⎣ ⎦
  
If they, in contrast, deny the contract 'BBC , i.e. decide to remain uninformed, they will 
either have to take the contract HKC  with an expected utility of 
( ) ( )U HK HE C u W p L= − ⋅  or remain without insurance with the reservation utility 
                                                 
30  It can be shown, that when the self-selecting constraint for type U holds, then the self-selecting con-
straint for type H also does.  
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( ) (1 ) ( )U U UU p u W L p u W= ⋅ − + − ⋅ . Therefore, the value of the additional information, 
i.e. the value to the uninformed driver of choosing the contract with contingent acces-
sion to the black box, is: 
(10) * ( ) (1 ) ( ') ( )L LK H H BB U HKI q EU C q EU C EU C−= ⋅ + − ⋅ −  or  
(11) * ( ) (1 ) ( ') UL LK H H BBI q EU C q EU C U−= ⋅ + − ⋅ − , respectively. Only if this is 
positive ( * 0I > ), will the uninformed choose the contract with the clause for contingent 
accession to the black box.  
If the insurers expect the uninformed not to get informed, they will offer the contract 
set HKC , 'UC  and 'BBC . In this case the value of getting informed through choosing the 
contract with black box accession is 
(12) ** ( ) (1 ) ( ') ( ')L LK H H BB U UI q EU C q EU C EU C−= ⋅ + − ⋅ −   
which is, after some transformation, equivalent to 
(13)  ** ( ) ( ') (1 ) ( ') ( )L LK L U H H BB H HKI q EU C EU C q EU C EU C−⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= ⋅ − + − ⋅ −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
Should this be positive, i.e., 
** 0I > ( ) ( ')
1 ( ) ( ')
H HK H H BB
L LK L U
q EU C EU C
q EU C EU C
−−⇔ >− − , 
then the uninformed drivers will choose to get informed and take the contract with con-
tingent accession to the black box, so that in this case the contract set HKC , 'UC  and 
'BBC  cannot be an equilibrium.  
Since ( ') ( )U U U HKEU C EU C>  [and ( ') UU UEU C U> , respectively], it follows from 
(10) [and (11), respectively] and (12) that ** *I I< . Only if 0 ** *I I< < , will the un-
informed drivers choose to get informed, so that the equilibrium contracts will be HKC  
and 'BBC . If ** * 0I I< < , the uninformed will deny the contract with contingent ac-
cession to the black box so that the equilibrium contract set will be HKC , 'UC  and 'BBC . 
This will also happen if ** 0 *I I< < : given that only the contracts HKC  und 'BBC  are 
offered, the uninformed will choose 'BBC ; given that the contract set HKC , 'UC  and 
'BBC  is offered, they will choose 'UC . So, if just one insurer offers 'UC , provided that 
HKC  und 'BBC  are initially on the market, all uninformed will take 'UC  and thus 
deny 'BBC .  
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As can be seen, due to the classification risk, a contract with contingent accession to the 
black box is not automatically attractive to uninformed customers. Under certain cir-
cumstances the uninformed drivers will prefer to remain so.  
Nevertheless, the inclusion of the black-box contract into the set of contracts makes no 
one worse off, but at the same time makes informed low risks (L) better off. Hence, 
since the clause for contingent accession to the black box gives low risks the opportu-
nity to directly signal their risk type to the insurer without the necessity of taking over 
any risk, welfare is Pareto-improved.  
4 Adverse selection under monopoly31 
4.1 Symmetric information 
In contrast to perfect competition this time the monopolist skims off the whole surplus 
of the contractual relationship so that the insureds just receive their reservation utility  
(14)  ( ) (1 ) ( )i i iU p u W L p u W= ⋅ − + − ⋅ . 
When risk type is public information the optimal contracts are found with the insurer 
maximizing his expected profit subject to the participation constraint of the insured: 
(15) 
,
max
i i
i i i
r d
r p d− ⋅  
s. t.  ( ) (1 ) ( ) ii i i i ip u W L r d p u W r U⋅ − − + + − ⋅ − ≥ ,   ,i L H= ,   (RC-i), 
The resulting contracts *iC  are first-best and imply complete insurance *id L=  and an 
insurance premium of *i i ir p L z= ⋅ +  consisting of the actuarially fair premium and the 
profit per insured iz . This is also the risk premium of type i that he is willing to forego 
in order to move from the state without insurance PO  to complete insurance in *
iC  
(see Fig. 4). As can be seen in the figure, the indifference curves corresponding to the 
reservation utility pass through the state without insurance PO , and *
iC  are the cer-
tainty equivalents on these curves. 
                                                 
31 This case is presented very briefly, for a detailed discussion see the seminal work of Stiglitz (1977). 
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Figure 4: Adverse selection, monopoly 
4.2 Asymmetric Information 
When risk type is private information the insurer will not offer the first-best contracts 
any more, since both low and high risks will choose *LC , thus significantly reducing 
profits. Stiglitz (1977, 417-421) shows that the insurer will either offer self-selecting 
contracts, or he will offer an insurance contract only to the high risks, letting low risks 
uninsured.32 Unlike the situation with perfect competition the exact position of the self-
selecting contracts - if they exist - depends on the proportions of risk types. In order to 
determine these second-best contracts **HC  and **LC , the monopolist has to reduce 
the indemnity paid on the low risk contract so that it becomes unattractive to high risks. 
Formally this is accomplished through maximizing the total expected profit, subject to 
the participation constraints and the incentive compatibility constraints of both risk 
types: 
(16) 
** ** ** **
** ** ** **
, , ,
max ( ) (1 ) ( )
L L H H
L L L H H H
r d r d
q r p d q r p d⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅ − ⋅  
s.t. ** ** **( ) (1 ) ( ) LL L L L Lp u W L r d p u W r U⋅ − − + + − ⋅ − ≥   (IR-L) 
  ** ** **( ) (1 ) ( ) HH H H H Hp u W L r d p u W r U⋅ − − + + − ⋅ − ≥  (IR-H) 
                                                 
32  As in the case under perfect competition there is no pooling equilibrium (see Stiglitz 1977, 418-220, 
for a proof). 
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** ** **
** ** **
( ) (1 ) ( )
( ) (1 ) ( )
L L L L L
L H H L H
p u W L r d p u W r
p u W L r d p u W r
⋅ − − + + − ⋅ − ≥
⋅ − − + + − ⋅ −   (IC-L) 
** ** **
** ** **
( ) (1 ) ( )
( ) (1 ) ( )
H H H H H
H L L H L
p u W L r d p u W r
p u W L r d p u W r
⋅ − − + + − ⋅ − ≥
⋅ − − + + − ⋅ −   (IC-H) 
It can be shown that the participation constraint of the high risks (IR-H) is not binding 
(they get more than just reservation utility) and that it can be derived from the participa-
tion constraint of the low risks (IR-L) and the high risk incentive-compatibility-
constraint (IC-H). Moreover, the low risk incentive-compatibility constraint (IC-L) is 
not binding so that the problem reduces to (16) subject to (IR-L) and (IC-H) which are 
both binding. When solving it one gets **Hd L=  meaning complete insurance of the 
high risks and the optimality condition 
(17) 
** ** ** **
** ** **
'( ) '( ) '( )1 (1 )
'( ) '( )
H L L L L L
L L L H L
u W r u W L r d u W rq p p
q u W L r d u W r p p
⎡ ⎤− ⋅ − − + − −− −⎣ ⎦= ⋅− − + ⋅ − − . 
The resulting contracts **HC  and **LC  are depicted in Fig. 4, with **LC  implying 
partial insurance of low risks. The profit with high risks is reduced compared to the 
situation with symmetric information, but this is simply redistribution from the mo-
nopolist to the insureds: they now get some consumer surplus. In contrast, the monopo-
list’s profit with low risks is reduced too, but they still just get their reservation utility. 
This is due to the suboptimal risk-allocation now with low risks demanding compensa-
tion for partially incurring the risk of accident, which eventually reduces the profit of 
the insurer. Hence the situation leads to loss of social welfare compared to the situation 
with symmetric information.  
The same is true in case that there is no insurance of low risks33. As is shown by Stiglitz 
(1977, 421), there is a critical value for the proportion of high risks to low risks which, 
if exceeded, means that there is no separating equilibrium with high risks getting their 
first-best contract and low risks remaining without insurance, i.e., if 
(18) [ ]'( *) '( ) '( )1 (1 )
'( ) '( )
H L L
H L
u W r u W L u Wq p p
q u W L u W p p
− ⋅ − −− −> ⋅− ⋅ − . 
Clearly there is a loss of social welfare compared to the reference situation: both risk 
types have their reservation utility, the monopolist, however, has to forego his profit 
with low risks. 
                                                 
33  This is a corner solution to the maximization problem (16) found with the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. 
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4.3 Contract with a clause for black box accession  
In an analogous manner as with perfect competition the first-best situation can be re-
stored, if it is possible for the insurer to include a condition, which permits him acces-
sion to the black box after an accident has occurred. Here too, the insurer can offer in 
addition to the first-best contract for high risks *HC  a contingent contract BBC  with 
insurance premium *Lr  which offers full coverage, if the insured turns out to be low 
risk (i.e., it results in the first-best contract for the low risk *LC ) and a disadvantageous 
indemnity H BBd − , in case that the insured turns out to be a high risk (i.e. it results in 
H BBC − ). H BBd −  must be set so that high risks choose the “right” contract *HC , i.e., the 
incentive compatibility constraint 
(19) ( *) ( * ) (1 ) ( *)HH H L H BB H Lu W r U p u W L r d p u W r−− = = ⋅ − − + + − ⋅ −  
must hold. Indeed, the resulting wealth positions are as in the referential situation *HC  
and *LC - there is optimal risk allocation, both risks types receive their reservation util-
ity and the monopolist skims off the entire consumer surplus. Still, this is not a Pareto-
type improvement, since high risks are worse off than before (with **HC  from 4.2). 
Though not a direct market outcome (since the monopolist has the whole bargaining 
power), a Pareto-type improvement would occur, if the monopolist were forced by regu-
lation to continue offering **HC  instead of *HC . In this case the wealth position for 
high risks which is required to just discourage them from choosing the black box con-
tract will be 'H BBC −  in Fig. 4. Thus, the monopolist will increase his profits with low 
risks only, while both low and high risks will be made no worse off. This means a 
Pareto-type improvement of social welfare. 
4.4 Privacy 
Finally the question shall be addressed, what the outcome would look like, if there were 
a proportion k  of low risks - denoted as k -type low risks - who dislike the disclosure 
of private information per se and suffer a disutility of ( )g BB−  if this happens. For this 
purpose the corresponding assumptions which were made in the case of perfect compe-
tition apply. k -type low risks will never take the contract BBC , since with it they would 
have less than reservation utility. Therefore the monopolist has basically three possibili-
ties34: (i) to offer *HC  for high risks and a contract with contingent accession to the 
black box BBif kC , which results in a full insurance “pooling” contract 
L PC −  for both k -
                                                 
34  For all alternative cases the corresponding wealth position of the black box contract resulting for 
high risks, has to be derived so that it meets the incentive compatibility constraint of high risks. Be-
low this is not mentioned explicitly. 
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type and (1 )k− -type low risks. This contract can be designed so that it just meets the 
participation constraint of k -type low risks. Such a contract could be for instance L PC −  
in Fig. 4 (ii) to offer a pair of self-selecting contracts for high risks **Hif kC  and k -type 
low risks **Lif kC  and in addition to that a black box contract resulting in *
LC  for 
(1 )k− -type low risks, or (iii) to offer *HC  for high risks, a black box contract result-
ing in *LC  for (1 )k− -type low risks and to leave k -type low risks without insurance, 
which is in fact a special case of (ii).  
(ii) In presence of an alternative contract with contingent accession to the black box, the 
existence of k -type low risks will alter the position of the originally found self-
selecting contract set ( **, **)L HC C , since the particular self-selecting contracts de-
pend on the proportions of risk types. The proportion of insureds who will now take the 
self-selecting contract with partial insurance is reduced from q  to q k⋅ , since (1 )k− -
type low risks, who do not mind the disclosure of privacy, will prefer the contract with 
black box accession which results for them in the wealth position *LC . Thus the pro-
portion q k⋅  has to be inserted for q  in problem (16) in order to determine the new self-
selecting contract set ( **, **)L Hif k if kC C . Accordingly, the optimality condition (17) also 
changes and so does the critical value (18). Then, provided that the proportions of risk 
types are such that 
(20) [ ]'( *) '( ) '( )1 (1 )
'( ) '( )
H L L
H L
u W r u W L u Wq p p
k q u W L u W p p
− ⋅ − −− −> ⋅⋅ − ⋅ −   
holds, k -type low risks will remain without insurance (iii) and the contracts offered 
will be *HC  for high risks and BBC  ( *LC  effectively) for (1 )k− -type low risks. Oth-
erwise three contracts will be offered: a black box contract with wealth position *LC for 
(1 )k− -type low risks and the new self-selecting contract set ( **, **)L Hif k if kC C  for k-
type low risks and high risks respectively. Graphically, if the new self-selecting contract 
set exists, the contract **Hif kC  will lie somewhere between the initial self-selecting 
contract for high risks **HC  and the contract from the referential situation *HC . 
Analogously **Lif kC  will be situated somewhere between the initial self-selecting con-
tract **LC  and the position without insurance PO . This immediately follows from the 
conditions for existence of self-selecting contracts (18) and (20). Since 
(1 ) / (1 ) /q k q q q− ⋅ > − , it follows that if the critical value is greater than (1 ) /q k q− ⋅  
then it is also greater than (1 ) /q q−  or in other words: if **Hif kC  lies to the right of 
*HC , then **HC  will lie even more to the right. 
(i) The other possibility for the monopolist is to offer the contract pair *HC  and a black 
box contract BBif kC  with the wealth position ( , )
L P L PC L r− −=  contingent on being low 
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risk, so that the latter is chosen both by (1 )k− -type and k -type low risks. For this pur-
pose low-risks who dislike the revelation of privacy have to be compensated for accept-
ing the black box, i.e., the insurance premium L Pr − has to be set lower than *Lr  so that 
the participation constraint of k -type low risks just holds: 
(21) ( ) ( ) LL P Lu W r p g BB U−− − ⋅ =  
Of course, this also means that (1 )k− -type low risks will receive strictly more than 
their reservation utility. The monopolist will make a profit strictly less than in the refer-
ential situation in which he knows the risk types from the outset. Still, the total profit of 
the monopolist might be increased compared to a situation when the contract with con-
tingent accession to the black box is offered to k -type low risks only. In which one of 
both alternatives (i) or (ii) the insurer’s profit will be higher depends on the particular 
proportion k and on the dimension of the disutility ( )g BB−  caused by the implementa-
tion of a black box.35  
Concerning social welfare the same arguments can be put forward as in the case of per-
fect competition and the WMS subsidizing equilibrium. Even if there are some insureds, 
who dislike the loss of privacy, there is a Pareto-type improvement of welfare when a 
contract with contingent accession to the black box is offered, as long as high risks are 
not made worse off than without it, i.e. as long as the monopolist is forced by regulation 
to continue offering **HC . No matter if, depending on the particular expected profits, 
the monopolist then decides to offer a pooling contract L PC −  designed for both k -type 
and (1 )k− -type low risks or if he decides to offer all three contracts **HC  (for high 
risks), *LC  (for (1 )k− -type low risks) and **LC  for k -type low risks, there is always 
a Pareto-type improvement compared to the situation without the existence of black 
boxes (4.2). This is due to the fact that at least (1 )k− -type low risks (or even all low 
risks) are disburdened of the necessity for taking only partial insurance in order to sig-
nal their risk type. This can now be directly achieved through accepting the contract 
with contingent accession to the black box. 
                                                 
35  The greater the proportion of low risks disliking the revelation of private data k  and the smaller 
( )g BB , the more probable it is that the monopolist will make a higher profit with a pooling contract 
L PC −  for both k -type and (1 )k− -type low risks (i). 
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5 Moral Hazard under Monopoly36 
Now it is assumed that insureds no longer differ by their risk type but that they can in-
fluence the probability of accident through the exerted effort. There are only two possi-
ble effort levels – low We  and high Me  effort with corresponding probabilities of acci-
dent ( ) ( )W W M Mp e p p e p= > =  with (0,1)ip ∈ . The utility function 
( , ) ( ) ( )U w e u w v e= −  is separable in effort with ( ) ( )M Wv e v e>  being the disutility of 
effort.37 
5.1 Symmetric Information 
With two given effort levels, the insurer will maximize expected profits subject to the 
participation constraint of the insureds for a given effort level separately and then stipu-
late that one which brings about the higher expected profit. Formally the problem is: 
(22) 
,
max
i i
i i i
r d
r p d− ⋅  
s.t.  ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )i i i i i ip u W L r d p u W r v e U⋅ − − + + − ⋅ − − ≥  ,i W M=  
It is assumed that the insured would exert the higher effort if having no insurance, so 
that38 
(23) 
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
M M M
W W W
U p u W L p u W v e
p u W L p u W v e
= ⋅ − + − ⋅ −
> ⋅ − + − ⋅ −   
and that ( ) ( )M WE C E Cπ π⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤>⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ , so that the insurer will stipulate Me . With effort 
being observable the risk allocation is efficient, meaning complete insurance (see MC  
in Fig. 5). 
5.2 Asymmetric Information 
When effort level is unobservable the insurer will have to turn over part of the risk of 
accident to the insured in order to make him exert the higher effort. Formally this is 
achieved by adding to problem (22) for Me  the incentive compatibility constraint  
                                                 
36  For a detailed discussion see Macho-Stadler / Pérez-Castrillo (2001, 35-46, 57-62). 
37  With this specification the disutility of effort exerts an impact only on the exact position, but not on 
the slope of the indifference curves. 
38  In Fig. 5 this is reflected by PO  lying on the indifference curve which represents the reservation 
utility and corresponds to the high effort (higher slope) if MU e , while the indifference curve repre-
senting the same utility but low effort (lower slope) if WU e  lies above PO . 
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(24) 
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
M MA MA M MA M
W MA MA W MA W
p u W L r d p u W r v e
p u W L r d p u W r v e
⋅ − − + + − ⋅ − −
≥ ⋅ − − + + − ⋅ − −  
Both constraints are binding and the optimal contract ( , )MA MA MAC d r  is found as the 
solution of the system of both equations. Graphically this is the intersection between the 
indifference curve corresponding to the reservation utility and the higher effort level 
“  if MU e ” and the curve “IC”39, which represents all combinations of contingent 
wealth for which the incentive compatibility constraint is binding. Hence, indifference 
curves which correspond to different effort levels (i.e. probabilities and therefore have 
different slopes) but to the same utility must intersect on this line.  
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Figure 5: Moral hazard, monopoly 
As can bee seen in Fig. 5 the insurer will offer the just established contract MAC  if the 
expected profit with it is higher than the expected profit when demanding low effort and 
thus offering WC 40. Compared to the situation with symmetric information the insured 
still has just his reservation utility, but the profit of the insurer has declined 
( ) ( )MA ME C E Cπ π⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤<⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . Again this is due to the inefficient risk-allocation causing a 
                                                 
39  The IC-curve need not be a straight line. In Fig.5 it is depicted as such for simplicity. In all wealth 
positions above this curve the insured will choose the low effort We  and below the curve he will 
choose the higher effort Me . 
40  WC  is found by solving the maximization problem (22) for the low effort level We , which is not 
affected by the information asymmetry. In Fig. 5 the intersection (MA) of the certainty line of the in-
surer with the iso-profit curve [ ]( )MAE p C  lies to the left of the intersection (W) with the iso-profit 
curve [ ( )]WE Cπ which means that MAC  is more profitable than WC . 
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loss of welfare  It might be the case that the insurer prefers to demand the low effort and 
offer WC  instead of MAC , which is, though characterized by complete insurance, related 
with a reduction of profit ( ) ( )W ME C E Cπ π⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤<⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  too and hence with loss of social 
welfare. 
5.3 Contract with a clause for black box accession  
As with adverse selection the first-best situation is achieved when a contract is offered 
that allows accession to the black box contingent on having an accident. Hereby the 
monopolist can stipulate the higher effort Me  in the contract and cover the whole loss if 
the insured has really made this effort Me , and pay a smaller indemnity W BBd − , if he 
finds out that the insured has exerted low effort We . The particular value of the “penal-
izing” indemnity is determined by solving the incentive compatibility constraint for 
W BBd − : 
(25)  ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )W M W BB W M W M Mp u W L r d p u W r v e u W r v e−⋅ − − + + − ⋅ − − = − −  
The contingent wealth of someone who would exert low effort is depicted in Fig. 5 as 
W BBC −  which lies on the indifference curve corresponding to the reservation utility 
 if WU e . Thus the insured will just choose the higher effort Me .  
6 Moral Hazard under perfect competition 
6.1 Symmetric Information 
Under perfect competition and free entry the insurers will earn zero profits and insureds 
will maximize their expected utility under the zero-profit constraint of insurers. Which 
effort level will persist this time depends upon which effort level will maximize the 
expected utility of the insureds. For this purpose the maximization problem 
(26) 
,
max ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
i i
i i i i i i
d r
p u W L r d p u W r v e⋅ − − + + − ⋅ − −  
s.t. 0i i ir p d− ⋅ ≥ , ,i W M= , 
is solved for a given effort level, which results in complete insurance id L= and the 
actuarially fair insurance premium i i ir p d= ⋅ . Then, with these values, the expected 
utility is compared. The exerted effort will be Me , if ( , ) ( , )M M W WEU C e EU C e> . This 
is depicted in Fig. 6. By the same argument for which indifference curves representing 
the same utility level cross on the IC-curve (see 5.2), higher utility is represented by 
indifference curves which intersect the IC-curve higher and more to the right. There-
fore, in this figure, MC  is the equilibrium contract. 
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Figure 6: Moral hazard, perfect competition 
6.2 Asymmetric Information 
When effort is private information and provided that MC  is offered, insureds will 
maximize utility by exerting the low effort level We . In Fig. 6 the fact that 
( , ) ( , )M W M MEU C e EU C e>  is verified by the intersections of the corresponding indif-
ference curve with the IC-curve. This will cause losses to the insurers so that MC  can-
not persist in equilibrium. The incentive compatible contract MAC  is found through add-
ing to problem (26) the incentive compatibility constraint: 
(27) 
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
M MA MA M MA M
W MA MA W MA W
p u W L r d p u W r v e
p u W L r d p u W r v e
⋅ − − + + − ⋅ − −
≥ ⋅ − − + + − ⋅ − −  
Both constraints are binding so that in Fig 6. the optimal contract MAC  is found as the 
intersection of the zero-profit line 0Mπ =  and the IC-curve. As can be seen it implies 
partial insurance. This time it is the insureds who are worse off: in order to “commit” to 
the higher effort they have to partially incur the risk of accident. Still, in this figure, 
choosing high effort is better than switching to the low effort level 
[ ( , ) ( , )MA M W WEU C e EU C e> ]. However, also in case that low effort with WC  as the 
corresponding contract result, there would be a loss of social welfare because of 
( , ) ( , )w W M MEU C e EU C e< . 
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6.3 Contract with a clause for black box accession  
Since with asymmetric information the insureds at any rate incur a loss of utility, they 
will have an interest to reveal their exerted effort to the insurer. Hence, provided that 
the contract with accession to the black box is (technically) viable, insureds will choose 
it. With such a contract they will be able to achieve the first-best wealth position MC  
with complete insurance which maximizes their utility. In fact, the commitment to 
choose the higher effort is facilitated through the certain “penalty” of getting a smaller 
indemnity W BBd −  for the case that they should have chosen the low effort and have had 
an accident. Thus, compared to the situation without the possibility of reviewing the 
black box (6.2), there clearly is a Pareto-type improvement of welfare.  
7 Concluding remarks 
Inspired by the growing technical possibilities for observing driving behavior in ever 
increasing detail, we examined the consequences of insurers being able to obtain perfect 
information on risk type or behavior by reviewing the data from a black box after an 
accident has occurred. As was shown in the previous sections, provided that the black 
box reveals perfect information, the direct outcome will be the contracts from the refer-
ential situation with symmetric information, no matter if the problem of information 
asymmetry is adverse selection or moral hazard, or if it persists under perfect competi-
tion or monopoly. However, it was also shown that in those cases, in which high risks 
formerly received an information rent (namely in the cases of adverse selection under 
monopoly and adverse selection under perfect competition with cross-subsidization 
from low to high risks), high risks are made worse off when the new technological op-
tion is introduced. In these cases the black box does not automatically lead to a Pareto-
type improvement of welfare. Still, even in those cases a contract with contingent ac-
cession to the black box can lead to a Pareto-type improvement if some regulation is 
introduced. When it ensures that high risks are not made worse off, there remain only 
the positive effects on social welfare from low risks receiving complete insurance. 
Similarly the question of privacy loss was examined. It was shown that, as long as there 
are some people who don not mind the revelation of privacy, the black box will make 
them better off without making anyone worse off, so that there is again a Pareto-type 
improvement. 
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